We model the optimal regulation of continuous, irreversible, capacity expansion, in a model in which the regulated network rm has private information about its capacity costs, investments need to be nanced out of the rm's cash ows from selling network access and demand is stochastic. If asymmetric information is large, the optimal mechanism consists of a regulatory holiday for low-cost rms, and a mark-up regime for higher-cost rms. With the regulatory holiday, a rm receives the full revenue of capacity sales, and expands capacity as if it were an unregulated monopolist. Under the mark-up regime, a rm receives only a fraction of the capacity revenues, and is obliged to expand capacity whenever the price for capacity reaches a threshold. The regulatory holiday is necessary to fund information rents to the most ecient rms, which invest relatively early, as direct investment subsidies are not feasible. Keywords: regulatory holiday, real option value, asymmetric information, optimal contracts JEL classication:D81, D82, L51
Introduction
Since the nineties many regulated network industries switched from cost-plus (or rate-of-return) to incentive regulation, often under some form of price cap regulation. This switch was motivated by the fear that costplus regulated rms would gold-plate their networks and over-invest in capital (Averch and Johnson, 1962) and the realization that a price cap provides high-powered incentives for cost-eciency (Cabral and Riordan, 1989) .
1 However, in recent years stakeholders have argued that with high powered incentive regulation, rms postpone socially ecient investments in durable assets, especially in risky environments, and that a dierent form of regulation is necessary. For instance, in response to large investment needs, the UK electricity and gas regulator OFGEM modernized its price cap mechanism by explicitly taking into account these investment needs.
2 European energy directives allow specic network investments to be exempted from regulation in order to foster investments if uncertainty is large in a regime which is often called a regulatory holiday.
3 For the telecom sector, ETNO, the industry association representing European telecom operators, recommends relaxing access regulation, as it sees it as the main reason for European infrastructure investments lagging those in the U.S. (Williamson, Lewin and Wood, 2016) .
4 Also academic scholars recognize that implementing price cap regulation is challenging for durable investments and when uncertainty is important (Guthrie, 2006; Armstrong and Sappington, 2007) .
In this paper we contribute to this debate by studying the optimal regulation of capacity investments in a dynamic setting in which investment prospects are uncertain. For this we consider a regulated private rm that has to gradually expand its network to cope with a growth in demand for network access, needs to fund its investments from operating prots and has superior information on investments costs. The regulator contracts with the rm about when it should expand capacity (and when it would be better to delay), at which price the capacity should be sold, and which fraction of its revenues it may keep. The regulator acts as a social planner and maximizes the expected discounted sum of consumers' surplus and the rm's prot.
In the optimal regulatory mechanism existing capacity is always used eciently: prices for network access are equal to the short run marginal cost of transportation as long as there is spare capacity, and prices are above marginal cost, when there is congestion. Capacity is expanded, whenever the price for capacity reaches a threshold value. This price threshold increases with investment costs, and is always higher than under the rst best symmetric information optimum with demand uncertainty. Hence, investments are delayed.
5
As we assume that the rm does not receive subsidies, investment costs need to be paid from market revenues.
However, any operating prots that remain after those costs have been paid for, could be taxed by the regulator.
Under optimal regulation the regulator does not tax the rms which reveal to be relatively ecient, while the tax rate for the less ecient rms increases with their levels of ineciency. Those low tax rates are necessary to provide the ecient rms with information rents.
If the information asymmetry between the regulator and the rm is large, then the relatively ecient rms will be allowed to invest as if they were unregulated monopolists, as this provides the largest possible information rents. Hence, a regulatory holiday is optimal for those rms. If the information asymmetry is small, then the regulator will bunch the more ecient rms and require identical investment levels for these. Hence, optimal regulation no longer results in an equilibrium with full separation of types.
In our model demand growth is not fully predictable (i.e. stochastic) and network investments are sunk.
Hence the rm is continuously forecasting demand and balancing the benets of expanding capacity now (and obtaining additional revenue) and delaying investments (and obtaining superior information about future demand). In other words, it needs to take into account the real option value of investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . McDonald and Siegel (1986) show that an unregulated monopolist delays investments under uncertainty, and Pindyck (1988) extends this result to a continuous investment model. While also rst-best investment involves a delay, under monopoly, this delay is longer. If a regulator would try to correct this situation with only the price cap instrument at its disposal, then the rst best outcome cannot be reached (Dobbs, 2004) , as one instrument is used for two goals: ecient investments ex-ante and optimal consumption ex-post. Building on Dobbs, but introducing scale economics for capacity expansion in which case grouping investments across time is cost ecient Evans and Guthrie (2012) show that the price cap should be lowered and that it might be ecient to allow some demand rationing to increase the size of subsequent expansions. Roques and Savva (2009) Court of Justice.) Nevertheless, some leaked documents suggest that the German government is still considering softening the regulation on the incumbent to foster additional investments (Stupp, 2016) .
5 Note that the rst best investment expansion plan already delays investments to take into account the real option value of network expansion.
instruments to enforce investments. As we assume constant returns to scale in capacity expansion, it is never optimal to group investments or to ration demand, in contrast to Evans and Guthrie (2012) .
In order to model the interaction between the regulator and the rm, we rely on the assumption that the rm has superior information about its own investment costs as in the seminal paper by Baron and Myerson (1982) .
While most of those types of models allow for for lump-sum transfers to the rm, we impose a self-nancing constraint. In Baron and Myerson, the most ecient rm invests at the ecient level, i.e. there is no distortion at the top, and gains information rents by receiving a large lump-sum transfer. In our model, information rents can only be obtained by being more protable in the market, and hence investment levels need to be distorted away from the ecient level. In fact, we nd that if the information asymmetries are large, monopoly level investments are optimal for the most ecient rms. So we nd what could be called maximal distortion at the top. If information asymmetries are small, we nd a bunching equilibrium for the most ecient rms. Our results are similar to Gautier and Mitra (2006) . They assume that the regulator can provide lump-sum transfers but is limited by its budget constraint, which is determined exogenously. They nd bunching for ecient types and separation for less ecient types. In our model, the transfers that the rm can receive are determined endogenously by its investment decisions and the revenues those investments generate. Moreover, we nd a separating equilibrium if information asymmetry is large.
One strand of the literature on incentive regulation and durable investments highlights the lack of commitment by the regulator.
6 If a regulator cannot commit to a price level for a suciently long period, it will lower prices once investment has taken place as those prices are ex-post ecient. This will lead to hold-up and lower investments ex-ante. In order to address this commitment problem Gans and King (2004) propose a regulatory holiday in which the regulator commits not to regulate prices for a limited duration, under the implicit assumption that it is easier to commit not to regulate than to commit to a high regulated price. We nd that even if the regulator has full commitment power, it might be optimal to provide a regulatory holiday to the most ecient rms, as this provides information rents for rms who want to invest earlier and with larger quantities. Note that the regulatory holiday in our model is not unconditional. If a rm with a regulatory holiday invests too late, then a fraction of its operating prots should be taxed. The characterization of the telecom sector by the European association of telecom operators highlights many of our assumptions:
The bulk of the investment required to meet policy objectives for the Digital Single Market will need to come from private investment in Europe's access networks. This private investment is a continuous and incremental, rather than a one-o, process. Investment decisions are constrained 6 Another strand of literature discusses the practical challenges for implementing price cap regulation when long term investments are necessary. Joskow (2008) reports problems with the correct measurement of the cost of capital in the energy sector and the diculties for setting new prices at the end of a regulatory period. Evans and Guthrie (2005) extend Ramsey pricing to a dynamic setting and shows that the incentive regulation is not feasible if the regulator takes the value the investments at their replacement value.
7 Instead of a growth of demand volume, a dierent interpretation of our model would be that demand for quality increases over time. Equivalently, instead of demand growth and innitely lived assets, we could assume constant demand and network capacity which degrades over time and where the rm builds replacement capacity when necessary. Mathematically this model would be very similar.
by the annual cash ows generated by the businesses.... Market players are better placed to make ecient investment decisions than NRAs [National Regulatory Authorities] or governments. They have far more information on both the incremental costs of deploying new technologies and the incremental revenues which might ow from investing (Williamson, Lewin and Wood 2016, Pg.2-3 ).
In our model we assume that the regulator not only regulates the rm's revenue (by setting which fraction of operating prot the rm is allowed to keep), but also enforces the required investments levels. Such dual requirements are also found in practice. For instance under the new RIIO regulatory model for the UK energy markets, the regulator not only species a certain price level, but also agrees on specic output parameters. If rms are unable to reach those output targets they will loose their operating license (OFGEM, 2010a).
In our paper we do not consider one-o (lumpy) investments. Moreover, we consider information asymmetry on a static parameter (costs) and assume that the information asymmetry is not related to the stochastic demand realization, although those features might sometimes be present in practice. We refer to two companion papers for those aspects of regulation: Broer and Zwart (2013) assume that investments are lumpy and only occur once; Arve and Zwart (2014) assume asymmetric information with respect to stochastic parameters instead of static ones, and allow for lump sum transfers to the rm.
In telecommunication markets, access providers are often vertically integrated and compete with the buyers of network access in a downstream retail market. Those access providers might also decide to by-pass the existing access provider, by investing in a competing network. The regulator needs to take those aspects into account when designing access regulation. We neglect those additional considerations in our paper. Cambini and Jiang (2009) provide an excellent survey of this extended eld of study.
2 Model
We consider a continuous-time, continuous investment model of a principal, the regulator, contracting with a monopolist to make irreversible investments dQ(t) to expand network capacity Q(t), as in Dobbs (2004) .
Capacity is a continuous variable, and capacity expansions come at a constant marginal cost c. There is no depreciation of capacity.
9 Initial capacity at t = 0, the time of contracting, is Q(0) = 0, i.e. we consider a greeneld project.
10 Marginal cost c is drawn from a cumulative distribution
and density f (c) > 0. A sucient condition that the solution of the rst-order conditions actually corresponds to a maximum, is that the density is downward sloping f (c) ≤ 0 on its support [c L , c H ]. We will assume this. 11
At each moment in time, the capacity Q(t) is sold to users at a price p(t) (we will drop the t-dependence of price and other variables in subsequent notation).
The demand for network capacity has constant elasticity,
where 0 < γ < 1 is the inverse of demand elasticity. The associated ow of gross consumer surplus from using Q is then AQ −γ /(1 − γ).
The demand shift parameter A is stochastic, and satises a geometrical Brownian motion,
8 The policy discussion is further complicated by the Ladder of Investments idea. Setting low access prices initially might attract entrants, who are then incentivized in a later stages by a higher access price to build their own networks.
9 It would be a straightforward extension of the model to assume a constant depreciation rate. 10 Alternatively, we demand that the regulator also needs to remunerate the monopolist for its existing investments in ecient capacity.
11 Below we will show that our condition will only be relevant for costs above a certain (endogenously determined) threshold level. If local rst order conditions are not sucient, then the optimal contract will need additional ironing as in Guesnerie and Laont (1984) .
where µ and σ > 0 are the associated drift and volatility parameters. As A grows over time, demand for capacity will increase, making capacity investment more valuable. We will assume that demand A and capacity Q are observable and veriable by the regulator, but the realization of investment cost c is private information. The principal's objective is to maximize expected total welfare which is the dierence of gross consumers' surplus and investment costs. The ow of total welfare, given costs c, equals
where dQ(t) ≥ 0 is the irreversible investment made at time t. The continuation value of total expected welfare at time t and capacity Q equals the expected discounted sum of these ows,
where E denotes the expectation over A(t), and r the risk-free rate. We assume r > µ.
The regulator contracts with the monopolist to achieve optimal investment. A contract species an investment rule, that depends on the observable parameters A (demand size) and Q (installed capacity), as well as a monetary transfer to the agent that remunerates him. We assume the following budget constraint: total expected remunerations T cannot exceed the total expected proceeds from the sale of capacity,
In addition, we impose the participation constraint on the monopolist that total expected prots should be non-negative at the time of writing the contract, for any cost c:
3 First-best and monopoly benchmarks
As a benchmark, we rst explore the rst-best outcome (as analysed in Pindyck, 1988) . In the absence of asymmetric information, the principal will design an investment policy that species capacity additions as a function of the state variables A, the current value of the demand shift parameter, and Q, the current installed capacity: capacity will be expanded as soon as demand reaches some threshold value. We denote byĀ(Q) the threshold value for A, given Q, at which investment occurs. 12
With c known, the principal sets the thresholdĀ(Q) to optimize total continuation welfare
The standard method of solving for W is rst to note that in the region A <Ā(Q) where no investment occurs, W satises a Bellman equation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) 13 ,
Imposing the boundary condition that W vanishes when A → 0, the general solution to this dierential equation 12 Note that since there is no exogenous dependence on time other than through A, the optimal policy, as well as total welfare, cannot explicitly depend on time t. 13 This follows straightforwardly from an application of Ito's rule to W (A + dA, Q, t + dt).
takes the form
where g(Q) is any function of Q and λ is the positive solution to the fundamental quadratic r = µλ+ 1 2 σ 2 λ(λ−1).
In this expression, the rst term represents the expected present value from using existing capacity Q (without any future expansions), while the second term is the value of the option to expand capacity beyond its current level if demand rises.
Next, we solve for g(Q) by imposing the boundary condition at the point of investmentĀ(Q), that the marginal benet of increasing Q should equal the marginal cost of investment,
Substituting for W , we nd a condition on the derivative of g(Q),
We impose that as Q goes to innity, there is no longer an (option) value to further investment (g(Q) → 0), to
which species, jointly with equation (7), total welfare W , given an investment thresholdĀ(Q). Note that welfare W is and increasing function of g(Q). The optimal investment threshold then follows from point-wise maximization of the integrand, and is given bȳ
or in other words, investing whenever price p reaches the levelp c . At t = 0, when capacity Q = 0, there will be a one-o investment Q 0 = (
1/γ to bring initial price to the threshold price.
The price at which optimal investment occurs exceeds the annualized costs by the factor λ/(λ − 1) > 1, which itself depends on the parameters of the stochastic process and in particular grows as volatility σ increases.
This is a reection of the well-known option value of delaying investment (McDonald and Siegel, 1986) .
As a second benchmark, it will be relevant to consider the investment rule that an unregulated monopolist receiving all revenues from selling capacity would choose. Dene the rm's prot ow as
and the associated total expected continuation value of the rm as
The unregulated monopolist will then choose an investment thresholdĀ(Q) that maximizes that expected value.
The analysis is similar to the total welfare maximization, with rm value taking the form
analogously to expressions (7, 8) for total welfare. We can again use point-wise maximization to nd the prot maximizing investment policy. This is to invest as soon as prices rise to the monopoly price level
This expression diers from the welfare optimizing pricep c by the 1 − γ factor, representing the standard Lerner
Finally, it is useful to evaluate total rm value V (A, Q) under the rst-best investment rule, i.e. invest whenever price reachesp c . Substituting the corresponding thresholdĀ(Q) in the rm's value function (12), we nd that the rm just breaks even, including the costs of the initial investment to bring capacity from Q = 0 to a level consistent with the threshold price. In other words, with symmetric information on costs, the regulator can ask the rm to invest according to the rst-best rule, and remunerate it using the proceeds of the capacity sales, hence satisfying both the budget constraint (5) and the rm's participation constraint (6). We summarize these benchmark results as Lemma 1. Compared to a welfare optimizing social planner, a monopolist delays investment in capacity. That is, it waits until demand has risen to higher levels before investing. Threshold prices that trigger investment arē
for the monopolist and the social planner respectively. When a greeneld rm invests at the competitive threshold p c , total expected revenues from selling capacity at market clearing prices equal total costs,
4 Optimal regulation under adverse selection
In this section we turn our attention to regulation with asymmetric information on the rm's capacity expansion cost c. We consider the regulator oering the rm a (menu of ) contracts for a capacity expansion schedule that may depend on demand (or price) realizations, which are observable and contractable. In return, the regulator oers a transfer fee T to the rm. The fee has to be nanced out of the expected revenues of the capacity sale and therefore has to satisfy budget constraint (5). And the rm should earn a non-negative prot, as reected by participation constraint (6). The regulator maximizes expected total welfare, which is the dierence of gross consumers' surplus and investment costs.
Without asymmetric information on costs, we saw in section 3 that the regulator can achieve the rstbest investment levels (invest when prices reach threshold pricep c ), while respecting budget and participation constraints. With private information on costs, the contracts oered will need to respect incentive compatibility as well, and therefore will need to leave information rents to the rms. In view of the budget constraint, distorting the contracts from the rst-best scheme is now optimal.
In analyzing the optimal scheme, we follow the standard procedure in optimal contract design, and focus without loss of generality on direct revelation, incentive compatible mechanisms. The regulator oers a menu of contracts to the rm, consisting of a transfer T (ĉ), and an investment threshold,Ā(Q,ĉ), that depend on the rm's reported costĉ. The rm, by reporting costsĉ, chooses the best option from this menu, which we design such that truthful reporting,ĉ = c, is optimal.
We saw that both rst best and prot maximization require investing when prices reach threshold level,p c andp m respectively, where those thresholds did not depend on capacity. Here, for expositional simplicity, we assume likewise that the optimal thresholdĀ(Q,ĉ) under adverse selection takes such a form, i.e. there will exist a threshold pricep(ĉ) such thatĀ(Q,ĉ)Q −γ =p(ĉ).
In the appendix we demonstrate that this is indeed optimal. We can then express the menu of contracts as a set of transfer fees and threshold prices, {(T (ĉ),p(ĉ))}.
At current demand level A, a contract specifying price thresholdp(ĉ) will require a greeneld rm to immediately invest capacity Q(p) to make current price equal the threshold price, Q = (
In addition the rm will have to increase capacity as demand A grows to ensure prices remain below the threshold. Total rents R of accepting the contract (T (ĉ),p(ĉ)), for a rm with actual costs c, are then given by
In the rst line, we used the expected present value of the costs of future expansions, computed analogously to the cost component of the rm's continuation value V from (12). In the second line, we substitutedĀ(Q) =pQ γ , to evaluate the integral.
Incentive compatibility now requires that the rm optimizes this value if it truthfully reveals its costs, c = c, choosing fee and threshold (T (c),p(c)) from the menu of contracts. Writing the resulting prots from this optimization as Π(A, c) = R(A, c,ĉ = c), we derive the following necessary conditions for incentive compatibility.
Lemma 2. Incentive compatibility requires that total prots Π vary with costs c as
and that the investment price thresholdp(c) is non-decreasing in costs c.
We will analyze the welfare optimizing choice of contracts under incentive compatibility constraint (17), as well as the budget and participation constraints, and ignore the monotonicity requirement on the threshold for the moment. After nding an optimal threshold, we will verify that monotonicity indeed holds. As a rst step let us write the welfare function and the budget constraint in terms of the threshold pricep.
The regulator's objective is to maximize the total welfare, averaged over the possible realization of costs c.
For a given cost c and threshold pricep, welfare includes the costs of a one-o lumpy investment Q to bring price to the threshold at the current value of the demand shift A, the expected welfare generated by this investment Q, as well as the expected additional welfare from future network expansions (i.e. real option value). From equation (7),
where again Q = (
The budget constraint is that for any cost c, total prots, Π, cannot exceed total revenues minus costs.
Using the expression for continuation value of revenues and costs (equation 12) and again substitutingp, we can write this as
Summing up, we can now state the regulator's optimization program in terms of an optimal control problem, with state variable Π(c) and controlp(c), and the Hamiltonian
with f (c) the density of the distribution of costs, co-state variable ν(c) the multiplier of the incentive constraint (17), and φ(c) the multiplier for the budget constraint (19). The resulting rst-order conditions for the optimum
At the upper boundary of the support of c, we impose that prots are zero, Π(c H ) = 0. At the lower boundary, we have either ν(c L ) = 0, or price is at its monopoly levelp m (c L ).
The solution to these rst-order equations is as follows Proposition 1. Optimal threshold prices fall in one of three regimes:
• Regime I, the markup regime: the budget constraint does not bind, φ = 0 and ν is constant. In this regime,
. (23) • Regime II, the bunching regime: the budget constraint binds,p is a constant in between competitive and monopoly pricesp m (c) ≥p ≥p c (c), and
for some c 0 within the interval in which this regime holds.
• Regime III, the monopoly regime: the budget constraint binds, price is at the monopoly level,
We see that as long as f (c) is non-increasing, prices are non-decreasing in each of the regimes. The optimal strategy is then a combination of two of the above regimes, joined together such that threshold pricep, co-state variable ν and prot Π are continuous on the regime boundary:
Proposition 2. Optimal regulation involves either monopoly pricing (regime III) for the lowest cost types, followed by the markup regime (Regime I) for higher types; or bunching at constant price (Regime II) for the lowest types, followed by the markup regime (Regime I).
In the next section, we provide an illustration of the optimum strategy for the particular case of uniform cost distribution f (c).
Example
For an illustration of the optimal regulation, we explore the case with uniform distribution on investment costs,
In that case, we can do the required integrations analytically, and use that to solve the model. As we will see, if the range of costs, measured by c H /c L , is not too large, we will have an optimum in which lower-cost rms bunch at a constant price (Regime II), while for higher costs rms, the budget constraint will not be binding and we are in the markup regime. Conversely, if cost uncertainty is large, the lowest cost types will end up being unregulated and setting monopoly prices instead.
To nd the optimum we need to join together the various pricing regimes in a continuous fashion. We cannot have only the markup regime with constant ν, since the boundary condition requires ν(c L ) = 0, which would imply marginal cost pricing,p =p c everywhere and would violate incentive compatibility. It is also easy to see that the only possibilities are to have either the monopoly regime at low costs, and the markup regime for higher costs, or the bunching regime at low cost, with again the markup regime for higher costs. 
The rst equation in the proposition follows from integrating ν between c L and c b , and requiring that its end value equals the markup in the markup regime. The second equation follows from making sure the prots at that transition point (where the budget constraint holds with equality) coincide with the integral of the incentive compatibility constraint, and prots at c H are zero.
We plot the results of the two solutions, one for high cost uncertainty (high c H /c L ), gure 1, and one for low cost uncertainty (c H /c L nearer to one), gure 2. In the rst case, we have monopoly pricing up to c m , and in the second we see bunching at constant price for low realizations of costs.
With a direct revelation mechanism, the regulator oers the menu of contracts {(Π(c),p(c))} and the rm truthfully announces its type c. Alternatively, the regulator could oer a menu of contracts {τ (p)} in which the rm announces at which maximum threshold price levelp it will invest, and the regulator taxes a fraction τ (p) of the revenue of selling capacity. Given an optimal menu of contracts {(Π(c),p(c))}, the tax rate τ (p) is determined implicitly by the following condition:
where Revenue(p) and Cost(c,p) are dened by equation (19) . Such a τ (p) exists asp(c) is strictly increasing in the mark-up regime and τ is zero in the two other regimes as the budget constraint binds and hence the rm gets all revenues from sales. For the markup regime we nd To benet from the zero tax rate the rm needs to invest early, at a relatively low threshold price. Alternatively, the rm could invest later, which implies accepting a higher tax rate.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have derived the optimal regulation of network expansion, by combining the real option and principal-agent literature. We show that a regulatory holiday might sometimes be optimal, not to prevent hold-up problems created by a lack of commitment power by the regulator as in Gans and King (2004) , but because of the combination of a self-nancing constraint and information asymmetry: The information rents of ecient cost types need to be collected in the market, which require higher prices for network access and delayed investments. However, such a regulatory holiday is not a blanket authorization for the rm to invest whenever it feels t. It implies the requirement, in accordance with the relatively low expansion costs of the ecient rm, for suciently early investment. If information asymmetries are small, the ecient rm requires less information rents and a regulatory holiday is no longer optimal. Instead the regulator will bunch the regulatory contracts for the most ecient rms, obliging them to invest at a price below the monopoly price.
Note that whether a regulatory holiday is socially optimal, does not depend on the level of demand uncertainty, and the riskiness of investments.
14 This stands in contrast with the requirement in EU energy markets, that the risk should be too high for investments to incur without exemption. In our model, the regulatory holiday is a reward for the low cost rm, who invests earlier than the high cost rm.
In the optimal regulation, inecient rms are subject to an investment requirement, i.e. they are obliged to invest whenever the price for capacity reaches a threshold level. It is well known from the literature that when demand is stochastic, a price cap cannot be used to both limit the rents of the regulated rm and to incentivize timely investments. Instead the regulator needs to rely on a combination of instruments such as for instance in the UK where the new regulation sets a price cap but also sets an output obligation on the rms. Alternatively, as we show, the regulator can penalize a rm investing late by increasing its tax level.
Formally, our model considers greeneld investments. The same analysis holds, however, when regulated rms are allowed by law to recoup sunk investments cost of previously built assets, as long as these are at or below the regulated level. Such a principle of no regulatory takings is common. If, on the other hand, some of the investments have already been fully paid o at the time of contracting, the participation contraint is relaxed, and less information rents need to be paid to investors. The regulatory holiday regime is then less likely to be optimal. We also assumed that capacity does not depreciate. This could easily be adjusted by appropriate shifts in µ and r, as in Dobbs (2004) .
In telecom markets, the upstream network access provider often competes with multiple access buyers in a downstream market. In our paper we do not study the additional eects of providing access to downstream competitors. In that case, regulatory price setting in the retail market should also take into account the relaxation of the budget constraint in the network investment problem. 
and by the denition ofp c (14) this vanishes.
Proof of lemma 2 We have
and Π(c) = R(c,ĉ = c). Ifĉ = c optimizes R, we can use the envelope theorem to nd
To verify thatp(c) is non-decreasing in c, we note that truthful revelation for a rm with type c requires that R(c, c) − R(c,ĉ) ≥ 0 for anyĉ. Equivalently, for a rm with typeĉ it must be that R(ĉ,ĉ) − R(ĉ, c) ≥ 0. Hence, combining both expressions, for any c,ĉ, we must have that:
It then follows that forĉ < c, Q(p(ĉ)) ≥ Q(p(c)), or as demand is downward slopingp(ĉ) ≤p(c).
Proof of proposition 1 The rst-order condition of the Hamiltonian for Π (22) gives the dynamics for ν(c),
In cost-regions where the budget constraint (19) does not bind, its multiplier is zero, φ = 0, and hence ν is constant. Using the short-handp
we can write the rst-order condition of the Hamiltonian forp (21) as:
With φ = 0 and ν constant, this leads top = c + ν f in this markup regime I.
In the cost-regions where the budget constraint (19) does bind, the rm's prot is equal to the revenue from capacity sales Π = γλQ(p) γλ−1 (p − c) . From this we can derive the total derivative of prots as a function of the rm's type c: dΠ dc = ∂Π ∂p dp dc − γλQ(p) γλ − 1
Given the incentive compatibility condition (17), the rst term on the right hand side is zero, we must then have that eitherp is constant, or ∂Π ∂p = 0, and hence monopoly pricing.
In the case of constantp, we are in the bunching regime II. From the rst order condition onp, with dν/ dc = φ, we then have 
Proof of proposition 2 With f (c) non-increasing,
is non-decreasing in all three regimes. For the highest cost realization c H , we have that the information rents are zero, Π(c H ) = 0, and therefore a non-binding budget regime (φ = 0), so we will have the markup regime. Suppose that for lower cost levels, we have a region [c,c] in which the bunching regime at a constant pricep applies, c H >c > c > c L . As the lower boundary is assumed to be strictly larger than c L , the bunching regime is connected from below to one of the other regimes (monopoly or markup regime). Hence, at his point c =c, we havep − c = ν(c) f (c)
, since that relation holds in both monopoly and markup regimes. Similarly, the bunching regime is connected to the monopoly or markup regime from above, so we must havep −c =
ν(c) f (c)
. But this leads to a contradiction sincec > c and ν(c)/f (c) is non-decreasing.
Hence we cannot have c > c L , and hence if the bunching regime occurs it is optimal for certain cost level, it is also the case for all lower cost levels. 
